Outreach sequence drafts

{{firstName}}, I’m Alex, BD at Blockstream. We build Bitcoin infrastructure — custody, Liquid Network, satellite, mining. Been at it since 2014. We’re working with institutions on multi-sig custody that doesn’t rely on a single vendor’s black box. Open-source signing, geographically distributed keys, no per-transaction fees. If {{company}} is thinking about Bitcoin custody (or already doing it and frustrated with the current setup), happy to share what we’re seeing in the market. No pitch deck — just a conversation. Alex

{{firstName}}, Most institutional custody still runs on a single vendor’s HSM. One compromise = total loss. That’s not a security model, it’s a single point of failure with a compliance certificate. We wrote up how multi-sig eliminates this — no vendor lock-in, keys distributed across jurisdictions, and you can audit every line of signing code. [Link to whitepaper] Worth 10 minutes if custody is on your roadmap. Alex

{{firstName}}, Totally fine if this isn’t relevant right now. I’d rather not clutter your inbox. If you want occasional updates on what we’re building for institutional custody, click here: [opt-in link] If not, I’ll take the hint. No hard feelings. Alex

{{firstName}}, Curious — has your team looked at how your custody provider actually stores signing keys? Specifically, whether you can audit the code that controls them? Most institutions we talk to haven’t. Not because they don’t care, but because their vendor doesn’t let them. I’m at Blockstream. We’ve been building Bitcoin infrastructure since 2014 and we approach custody differently — open-source, multi-sig, no black boxes. If this is on your radar, I’d love to hear how you’re thinking about it. Alex

{{firstName}}, Not a hypothetical. It’s the question every CISO eventually asks about their custody stack. With single-vendor HSM setups, the answer is ugly. With multi-sig, it’s a non-event — no single key can move funds, and you rotate the compromised key without touching the rest. We put together a short breakdown of how this works in practice: [Link] Worth a look if your team is evaluating custody architecture. Alex

{{firstName}}, Totally get it if custody isn’t the priority right now. If you want to stay in the loop for when it is, click here and I’ll send you the occasional update: [opt-in link] Otherwise I’ll leave you alone. Either way, no pressure. Alex

{{firstName}}, Last year, a mid-size fund lost access to $400M in Bitcoin for 72 hours during a botched key ceremony. Nobody was hacked. They just couldn’t get enough signers in the same room with the right credentials at the right time. It was a process failure, not a security one. And it’s more common than anyone admits publicly. I’m Alex at Blockstream. We build custody infrastructure specifically designed so that scenario can’t happen — distributed multi-sig, no single-room dependency, auditable from top to bottom. If custody operations keep you up at night, happy to compare notes. Alex

{{firstName}}, True story. A regional bank signed a 2-year custody deal. Six months in, their compliance team asked to see the signing code. Vendor said no — proprietary. That was the end of the relationship. They couldn’t get past the fact that billions in client assets were secured by code nobody on their team could read. We hear this a lot. It’s why Blockstream builds custody on open-source signing infrastructure. Here’s what that looks like in practice: [Link] Alex

{{firstName}}, I’ve sent a couple emails about how institutions are rethinking custody. If it landed, great — click here to keep hearing from us: [opt-in link] If not, no worries. I won’t email again unless you opt in. Alex

{{firstName}}, Not hackers. Not zero-days. Internal access abuse. The standard custody response is more access controls on the same single-vendor system. The problem: you’re still trusting one set of keys, managed by one provider, auditable by no one outside that provider. Multi-sig changes the math. No single party — internal or external — can move funds alone. And when the signing code is open-source, you don’t have to trust the vendor’s word that it works correctly. I’m Alex at Blockstream. We’ve been building this for 10+ years. Happy to walk through the architecture if useful. Alex

{{firstName}}, That’s the concentration risk nobody’s talking about. Nearly all institutional Bitcoin is custodied by Coinbase, BitGo, or Fidelity. Three targets. Blockstream’s approach is the opposite of concentration — multi-sig across independent signers, no single vendor dependency, keys distributed by jurisdiction. We wrote up the architecture: [Link] 4-minute read. Relevant if {{company}} holds or plans to hold Bitcoin on behalf of clients. Alex

{{firstName}}, I’ve sent two emails about institutional custody architecture. Quick gut check: Want occasional updates from Blockstream? [opt-in link] Not relevant? Do nothing — I’ll stop here. Either way, appreciate the time. Alex

{{firstName}}, Hey — I’m Alex, work on the enterprise side at Blockstream. We do Bitcoin custody, Liquid Network, and a bunch of infrastructure stuff. I noticed {{company}} and thought there might be some overlap with what we’re building, especially on the custody side. We take a pretty different approach from the usual suspects — open-source, multi-sig, no single-vendor lock-in. No agenda here. If you’re ever curious about what we’re up to, happy to chat. Alex

{{firstName}}, We just published something on how open-source custody actually works at the institutional level — not the ideology pitch, but the nuts and bolts of key management, signing policies, and what an audit trail looks like. [Link] It’s a quick read. Figured it might be relevant given what {{company}} is working on. Alex

{{firstName}}, Just wanted to check — any interest in hearing from us occasionally? We send updates on custody, Liquid Network, and what’s happening in institutional Bitcoin. If yes: [opt-in link] If nah: totally fine, I’ll drop off. Cheers, Alex